Space, Symbols and Speech in Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti's Behzti and its Reception by Ahmed, R
1 
 
Space, Symbols and Speech in Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti’s Behzti and its Reception 
Rehana Ahmed, Queen Mary University of London 
 
Abstract 
In December 2004, the staging of Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti’s play Behzti at the Birmingham 
Repertory Theatre triggered protests by some members of the Sikh community who 
considered it offensive. By unearthing and exploring tensions in the play’s 
representation of a Sikh community, this essay sheds light on some of the tensions in 
multicultural Britain in order to complicate and challenge an interpretation of the 
dispute in terms of a reductive binary of creative freedom versus religious censure and 
censorship. While for the liberal secularist critic and proponent of free expression the 
explosion of taboos is vital to an expansion of freedom, a hardline adoption of this 
position which fails to take into account the material specificities of a religious response 
to a creative work, including the demography of the protestors, can result in a 
curtailment of the freedom of a religious minority. Reading the play in dialogue with the 
controversy it generated, the essay seeks to ground the outbreak of religious minority 
offence in its local material conditions, and, by doing so, to underline the unequal access 
to social, cultural and spatial capital that shaped the controversy.  It focuses in 
particular on religious symbols, space, and speech, exploring how they figure in both the 









Who shall have control over the story? Who has, who should have, the power not only to 
tell the stories with which, and within which, we all lived, but also to say in what manner 
those stories may be told? (Salman Rushdie 360) 
The freedom of speech principle which claims to be democratic is, in fact, deeply racially 
coded. (Sarita Malik, “Limits”) 
 
Introduction 
In December 2004, the staging of Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti’s play Behzti at the Birmingham 
Repertory Theatre triggered protests by some members of the Sikh community who 
considered it offensive. When the protests turned to violence and the police could no 
longer guarantee audience safety, the theatre management took the decision to cancel 
the play.1 The “Behzti affair”, as it came to be known, generated substantial media and 
political discussion in Britain, resonating as it did with the controversy surrounding 
Salman Rushdie’s 1988 novel The Satanic Verses, and coinciding with heated 
parliamentary debate about whether to make it an offence to incite hatred on religious 
as well as racial grounds.2 Less than a year after the Behzti affair erupted, the 
publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in Danish newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten, and the global protests that followed, helped keep the spotlight on 
Bhatti’s controversial play. Subsequent disputes surrounding the film adaptation of 
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Monica Ali’s novel Brick Lane in 2006, the publication of Sherry Jones’s novel The Jewel 
of Medina (2008), and the publication in French magazine Charlie Hebdo of cartoons 
satirising the Prophet Mohammed and Islam (2006, 2011, 2012, 2015) have added 
further layers to the debate.3  
As has been well documented by Ralph Grillo and Helen Freshwater in particular, 
the Behzti affair was widely and reductively represented as a battle between freedom of 
speech and creativity on the one hand, and religious censure and censorship on the 
other (Grillo, “Artistic Licence”; Grillo, “Licence to Offend?”; Freshwater 139-58). The 
absolutist valorisation of freedom of expression that emerged in the wake of the Satanic 
Verses controversy dominated responses to this subsequent dispute, particularly in 
Britain’s media and literary establishment, with the Sikh protestors constructed as 
regressive, repressive and destructive (see, for example, Hytner; Jury). At the height of 
the controversy an open letter appeared in The Guardian, signed by over 300 members 
of the theatre profession, who defended the play and objected to the protests in 
uncompromising terms (Freshwater 144). Writer Hanif Kureishi’s comments were 
typical of the thinking that underpinned this defence: 
the Sikh community should be ashamed of the fact that it is destroying theatres. 
Destroying a theatre is like destroying a temple … Our culture is as crucial to the 
liberal community as temples are to the religious community and I think that the 
right to speak, the right to be heard is crucial to the lives of all of us in this 
country. (Kureishi) 
Kureishi reductively polarises religiosity and creative expression, and elevates the latter 
to a position of sanctity while failing to acknowledge the play’s potential denigration of 
an actual religious site.  
4 
 
This article offers a reading of Behzti in dialogue with the controversy it 
triggered. By unearthing and exploring tensions in the play’s representation of one 
particular Sikh community, it sheds light on some of the tensions in multicultural 
Britain in order to complicate and challenge normative representations of the dispute in 
terms of creative freedom versus religious offence. In particular, the essay seeks to 
ground this outbreak of religious minority offence in its local material conditions. 
Building on my earlier work on the Satanic Verses and Brick Lane affairs (Ahmed ch. 2 
and 4), as well as on Anshuman A. Mondal’s scholarship on the politics of free speech 
and Muslim offence, the article underlines the significance of power to the Behzti affair, 
specifically the unequal access to social, cultural and spatial capital that shaped it. The 
framing of the affair in terms of a courageous artistic voice fighting against reactionary 
forces of repression papers over the social chasm between the privileged arts 
establishment with its advocates of freedom of expression and the Sikh community in 
Birmingham specifically and Britain more broadly. As Mondal writes: 
What is being performed in the giving or taking of offence is power or, rather, to 
be more precise, the positioning of oneself in a power relation. To give offence is 
to display one’s ability to do so; to take offence is to signal one’s subordinate 
position in that power relation, to display a vulnerability that marks oneself as a 
victim or object of power – to perform one’s powerlessness. (23)  
To apply this thinking to Behzti is by no means to suggest that Bhatti, or the play’s 
director Janet Steel, set out to give offence. But it is to propose that the fact that the play 
caused offence demonstrates the theatrical establishment’s position of power; and the 
fact that the protestors took offence demonstrates their vulnerability and 
subordination. While for the liberal secularist critic and proponent of free expression 
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the explosion of taboos is vital to an expansion of freedom, a hardline adoption of this 
position which fails to take into account the material specificities of a religious response 
to a creative work, including the demography of the protestors, can result in a 
curtailment of the freedom of a religious minority. Therefore, as Mondal suggests, 
“freedom”, or “liberty”, must be rethought so that it can be “unshackl[ed]… from … 
contemporary liberal discourse” (2). To be more inclusive, crucially, the idea of freedom 
must encompass a recognition of the inequalities of the public sphere which mean some 
people are freer than others, and as a consequence it must exercise a degree of restraint 
(2-3). Or, as Janelle Reinelt advises, “the notion of individual liberty” must be balanced 
with “a communitarian notion of equality and social justice” (14).  
Certainly in Europe, the majority of high-profile artistic controversies involving 
religious offence have had Islam at their centre. That the focus is rather on Sikhism in 
this case points to the significance of class and of the liberal aversion to the expression 
and practice of faith in the public sphere – factors which I suggest bind the Behzti affair 
to its Islamic counterparts, superseding the specificity of the religion in question. While 
Sikhism was undoubtedly central to the protestors, their protest was also underpinned 
by their class position; British Sikhs, as Grillo points out, are an under-privileged 
minority group, facing economic deprivation as well as race discrimination (“Licence to 
Offend?” 8). This points to the importance of reading religiosity in an intersectional 
manner, in dialogue with class and race, as well as gender and sexuality. Further, the 
mainstream response to the protest was shaped by stereotypes of Sikhism which – not 
unlike stereotypes of Islam – are rooted partly in the visibility of minority British 
adherents of the faith (e.g. their turbans, kirpans (or swords) and karas (or steel 
bracelets)), as well as their class position.4 Jasbir Puar, in her analysis of American 
responses to turbaned Sikh men in the wake of 9/11, explores the overlaps in 
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perceptions of Sikhism and Islam. Noting that, “[l]ike veiling, turbaning generates 
anxiety in the observer, the sense of inaccessibility, of something being out of place and 
out of time, of incomprehensibility”, she infers the role of visible symbols of difference 
in entrenching constructions of otherness (Puar 181).  
Religious symbols form a key focus of both the play and the controversy 
alongside space and speech. My reading will explore how these three tropes or concepts 
figure in the literary and social texts. It will trace within Behzti tensions that are often 
buried just beneath the surface of public and political discourses about British 
multiculturalism and that erupted on through? the play’s staging.5  
 
Space 
Diane Parkes, in her review for the Birmingham Evening Mail, describes Behzti 
thus:  
We have homosexuality, rape, violence against women, suicide, murder and 
thwarted love … if this is an attempt to lift the lid on the problems within Sikhism 
it leaves us a little disappointed. What begins as a sharp and black look at a 
modern family dilemma sinks beneath its own weight. 
Indeed, Bhatti’s play bombards us with a litany of patriarchal crimes against a British 
Sikh community’s women. Its two protagonists inhabit the margins of the community. 
Balbir has suffered a stroke and needs constant care from her daughter Min whose 
father Tej, we discover, committed suicide when Min was a child after she discovered 
his homosexual relationship with his friend Mr Sandhu. Mother and daughter’s attempt 
to re-enter the community by a visit to their local gurdwara to celebrate the birth of 
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Guru Nanak ends in Min’s rape by Mr Sandhu, now a senior figure at the gurdwara, her 
physical abuse by two women, Polly and Teetee (themselves victims of abuse within the 
gurdwara in their youth), and finally Sandhu’s murder by Min’s mother Balbir (Bhatti, 
Behzti).  
The play offers a potentially important critique of the silencing and abuse of 
women within a British Sikh community. Further, its focus on the domestic everyday 
might appear to position it outside the “exoticism and fanaticism” that James Procter 
rightly identifies as characterising representations of British South Asian culture (78). 
Yet, its immersion in emotional, physical and sexual abuse tips into sensationalism and 
inevitably feeds stereotypes of patriarchal oppression within South Asian communities, 
with its title, which translates as “honour”, connoting the spectre of “honour crime” that 
haunts the margins of the play. Given its sensational content, it is hardly surprising that 
it provoked members of the Sikh community. Rahila Gupta is right that the fear of 
pandering to racists must not silence voices that seek to expose crimes against women 
in minority communities. Nevertheless, it remains crucial that we recognise that a play 
like Behzti, freighted as it is with a “burden of representation” (Mercer), will be read as 
representative of Sikh culture and communities, and not primarily as “universal”, as 
Bhatti herself and critic Sumana Ray suggest (Bhatti, “Warrior”; Ray 95-96), or as about 
“the behaviour of individuals” (Steel, cited in Freshwater 151; Kotak). The fact that 
British Sikhs have limited access to artistic representation increases the representative 
weight of any single cultural work that features “their” community. This also means that 
members of the minority group of Sikhs (especially those who are economically 
disadvantaged and socially disenfranchised) are more likely to feel disowned, or 
displaced, by the few such works that do enter the public domain – in particular those 
that descend into stereotype.  
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Freshwater, in her chapter on Behzti, remarks on the prescience of the publicity 
image of an enormous pair of white knickers obscuring the face of a woman dressed in a 
red shalwar kameez (reproduced as the front cover of the published script), which 
suggests “the washing of a community’s dirty linen in public” (140). It might be argued 
that the image was selected long before the controversy erupted. However, the play’s 
provocation was in fact anticipated by the playwright and director who, following the 
advice of the Director of Communications for the Diocese of Birmingham, consulted 
community leaders prior to its staging. This led to the distribution of a leaflet to 
audience members outlining Sikh representatives’ objections to the play (Grillo, 
“Licence to Offend?” 10). I will return to these consultations in the final section of this 
article. For now, I will consider the principal objection to the play on the part of the Sikh 
protestors: the portrayal of rape in the space of a gurdwara (Singh Rai). The emphasis 
here was on the sanctity of this space and the defilement of this sanctity and that of the 
Guru, as Jasdev Singh Rai, director of the Sikh Human Rights Group, explains. In Behzti, 
the sacred space was subsumed under the secular space of the theatre – where, 
according to absolutist advocates of creative freedom, such as former Artistic Director 
of London’s National Theatre Nicholas Hytner, “there literally should be no limit to what 
the creative imagination can imagine. And … no limit to what the creative artist is 
allowed to imagine or to publish or perform” (40). The protestors’ emphasis on the 
sacred was beyond the comprehension of secular liberals such as Hytner; the sense of 
injury the protestors felt at the corruption of the gurdwara – which was for them more 
than a mere signifier standing apart from its divine referent – could not be translated 
into terms that their antagonists recognised.6 Yet the significance of the gurdwara 
extends beyond the sacred to encompass the material too. It is a space of community, as 
the Council for Sikh Gurdwaras in Birmingham emphasised in their 2001 Annual 
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Report, supporting welfare and educational provision for a minority group which has 
suffered marginalisation and economic deprivation (Grillo, “Licence to Offend?” 9; 
Ballard 109). Further, as Sarita Malik writes in an article on the controversy, the 
gurdwara is “one of the few shared, community public spaces where Sikh communities 
[in Britain] ... feel integrated” (“Censorship”). While the source of the protestors’ offence 
was located beyond western tradition, as Freshwater, among others, points out, it was 
also rooted in local British structures of class and race (152). Indeed, this imbrication of 
the sacred and the material is present in the play’s representation of the gurdwara, 
which initially emerges as a potential sanctuary for those who lack a place or are out of 
place. 
The play opens in Balbir and Min’s flat, a place of relative poverty. The flat 
belongs to the council – something which, we later discover, is a source of humiliation 
for Balbir in particular (Bhatti, Behzti 77). The loss of their home, which served as a 
space of refuge for other members of the Sikh community, followed Min’s father Tej’s 
suicide. At that moment of crisis Sandhu and other members of the Sikh community sold 
off the house, and Min and Balbir were made homeless (56, 68, 77). The deep 
significance to an immigrant family of ownership of place is underscored in the play, 
even when this place is “a filthy, crumbling end of terrace” (56). Min and Balbir’s council 
flat is a negative place of isolation for Min, one to which she clings out of a fear of the 
outside world approaching agoraphobia. By contrast, the gurdwara has the capacity to 
function as a positive place of community. Min describes it as “brilliant … All of it. Like 
when you wash up and clean in here, you’re doing it for everyone. Not yourself. But 
you’re still doing it because you want to … And the people around you, they’re good” 
(79). Yet this glimpse of the communitarianism of the gurdwara as supportive and 
enabling is undermined by the abuse Min suffers within this space, just as the loss of 
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Balbir’s house at the hands of the community undermines the positive notion of 
collectivity suggested by its function as a refuge. Balbir remonstrates:  
All of you shitters, taking refuge under my roof ... No murmurings or mutterings 
when the bricks and mortar slipped through my fingers and my name … My 
name was no longer spoken. Instead ended up written in red ink on a pocket blue 
rent book. (68) 
Indeed, in the play a positive notion of community is repeatedly evoked only to be 
fractured, and the space of the gurdwara is finally revealed as little more than a sham. 
Min’s “happy ending”, her liberation from her flat into the outside world, can only be 
achieved by exiting the gurdwara and Sikh community. In this flight she is accompanied 
by her lover Elvis, who is her mother’s young black caretaker and the only non-Sikh in 
the play (136-38). Elvis’s presence in the gurdwara and Min and Elvis’s developing 
relationship initiate a transgression of cultural and religious boundaries – or at least 
communication across such boundaries.7 In the end, such transgression or 
communication cannot be actualised within the gurdwara, or more broadly the Sikh 
community (of which it can be read as a microcosm), but only beyond it. Hence, while 
the sanctity of the space of the gurdwara is defiled by the play’s representation of sexual 
abuse within it, the possibility of the gurdwara as a place of social sanctuary is 
ultimately evacuated in the play.8 
This points to a binary of individual freedom for women versus a repressive 
patriarchal religious collective which, I suggest, shapes the play as well as normative 
responses to the dispute it triggered. This is entrenched in both the play and responses 
to it by a separation of the space of the gurdwara/community from its social context. In 
the play, there is very little sense of the gurdwara/community’s location in and 
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subordination to majority Britain. As a consequence, the oppressive and criminal 
behaviour on display is rooted solely in the community rather than in a wider context of 
intersecting hierarchies of class, race and religion, as well as gender, in which the 
community sits. Just as the relational nature of space – the fact that the community and 
its context are connected in a relationship of power – is obscured within the play, so it 
was obscured within constructions of the controversy it triggered.9 Rather, the theatre 
and the gurdwara, or, more broadly, the secular sphere of the creative arts and the 
sphere of religious faith, were portrayed as being polarised, as in Kureishi’s and 
Hytner’s responses to the affair. Speaking of the Renaissance period, Hytner writes: 
“The theatre actively promoted the humanist point of view to a society still gripped by 
religious absolutism ... The theatre was, and is, a secular space demonstrably interested 
in the fate of man, in this life” (41, emphasis in original). Similarly, theatre managers at a 
conference held in the wake of Behzti concluded that “intolerance” and “religious 
zealotry” were a “growing threat to freedom of speech” (Jury). Such a dichotomy of 
creative freedom and religious repression unfastens both the gurdwara and the theatre 
from their moorings in the material.10  
What Hytner and other like-minded critics of the protests did not fully 
understand is that the gurdwara, while a sacred space, extends into the domain of the 
secular and exists within social and racial hierarchies, as does the theatre (one is 
subordinated within these hierarchies and the other dominant). As Doreen Massey 
reminds us, space and place are “the product of social relations which are most likely 
conflicting and unequal” (151); gurdwara and theatre exist within these unequal 
relations. Sarita Malik represents them as relational rather than dichotomised by 
juxtaposing the significance of the gurdwara for British Sikhs regarding “the 
disconnection and disengagement between minority ethnic communities [in Britain] 
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and ‘our’ gallery, museum and theatre spaces” (“Censorship”). In this context, it is not 
surprising that the representation – and perceived defilement – of the space of the 
gurdwara within an arts space from which members of the Sikh community feel 
excluded might trigger what Malik describes as a “rise in defensiveness, honour and 
communal pride” (“Censorship”). Massey’s emphasis on the sociality of space is also 
important here. For Massey, “a spatialised subjectivity” is one that looks outwards, with 
a recognition that “others” exist alongside “us” in an unequal relation of power but 
embody ways of being that are just as valid as ours (59). To spatialise the Behzti affair 
and its protagonists is to recognise the significance of the sacred to the protestors as 
well as the impact of their subordinate position on their response to the staging of their 
place of religious worship in a theatre in their city. 
It is instructive, too, to zoom outwards from the space of the theatre to the city of 
Birmingham, which is home to over 30,000 Sikhs and has a history of minority struggle 
(BVSC). In particular, the area of Handsworth, where many of the metropolis’s Sikhs 
live, has seen uprisings by members of its Afro-Caribbean and South Asian communities 
on several occasions, most famously in 1981 when “race riots” spread across several 
major British cities. While these riots saw black and Asian protestors come together in 
solidarity against racist nationalism, in the 2005 riots in Handsworth and neighbouring 
Lozells, which took place less than a year after the protests against Behzti, the Afro-
Caribbean and South Asian communities were arrayed against each other. Kenan Malik 
situates these riots against the backdrop of the city’s multicultural policies, which were 
put in place in response to the 1985 Handsworth riots. Following the Greater London 
Council’s lead, Birmingham City Council created nine faith- and ethnicity-based 
organisations to represent their communities (K. Malik 65-67). Malik is deeply – and in 
my view problematically – critical of this approach. He argues that these policies were 
13 
 
not only divisive and homogenised ethnic groups that were in fact highly diverse, but 
also that they created inflexible religious and ethnic group identities – “segmented 
society and fixed identities,” as he puts it (70). Here Malik minimises the value of 
ethnicity and religion for minority communities as well as divesting them of agency 
(they are only capable of using definitions that others have imposed on them, 
apparently), and severs rioting from its roots in poverty and disenfranchisement. To 
contextualise these riots in inequalities of class, race and religion, conversely, reframes 
them as a form of territorialisation, or space-claiming, by the disenfranchised. By doing 
this, we might also read the contemporaneous Behzti affair not as a manifestation of a 
boundaried and repressive religious culture, but instead as an assertive attempt by the 
Sikh protestors to claim their “right to the city” (Lefebvre) as well as to the sacred space 
of the gurdwara. 
 
Symbols 
In addition to the location of sexual assault in the gurdwara, there were two 
other specific objections to Behzti on the part of Sikh community representatives, as 
Grillo points out (“Licence to Offend?” 11-12). One of these was to the use of religious 
hymns as background music to certain scenes. In particular, protestors objected to the 
use of the Ardas, a prayer in which Sikhs remember atrocities committed against them, 
to accompany the scene where Min is raped by Sandhu (Bhatti, Behzti 109). The third 
objection was to the perceived abuse of Sikh symbols, such as the kirpan and the turban. 
Grillo cites one example of this: the placing of a turban on a shoe rack (shoes, which are 
taken off on entry to a gurdwara, are associated with dirt in contrast to the purity of the 
turban) (“Licence to Offend?” 11). Other examples include the placing of a flowery 
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feminine headscarf on Elvis’s head, which echoes the subversion of norms of gender and 
sexuality that is threaded throughout the play; the use of Teetee’s scarf to gag the 
vulnerable Min; the proximity of a kirpan and a darts board on Sandhu’s office wall; and 
the eventual use of the sacred sword as a murder weapon (Bhatti, Behzti 61, 108, 118, 
47, 133). Within the play, the use (and perceived abuse) of these symbols point to the 
gap between an external display of religiosity, which is exposed as superficial or a sham, 
and internal faith, demonstrated most powerfully by Min. Despite their pious façade – 
emblematised by scarf, turban or sword – the gurdwara regulars are abusers who 
exploit these emblems, and the status they confer on them, to carry out and conceal 
their abuse. Indeed, the overt artifice of the theatrical stage contributes to the notion of 
the Sikh symbols, including the gurdwara as a symbolic space, as hollow, as mere props. 
Min describes the gap between external symbol and internal faith:  
All you lot in here … perhaps you talk too much … best sometimes to keep things 
inside … why do you always have to Say and Show and Make it known what you 
are? … Seems to me like everyone’s pretending the same as each other. Just 
letting the outside sparkle and twinkle like ... fairy lights … And my praising, it’s 
nothing to do with this. (134-35)  
Bhatti, too, gestures towards the significance of this gap in her foreword to the play, 
stating: “Much store is set by ritual rooted in religion – though people’s preoccupation 
with the external and not the internal often renders these rituals meaningless” (Bhatti, 
“Foreword” 17-18). Yet the protestors’ response suggests that they did not perceive 
external rituals or icons as meaningless.  
We might read the deeply felt importance of symbols to Sikhs in the light of Saba 
Mahmood’s exploration of the significance of religious icons in her discussion of the 
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Danish cartoons controversy. Mahmood highlights the form of relationality that, for 
Muslims, binds the material object to the sacred subject, an intimate connection that 
does not accord with the separation of signifier and signified that stems from 
Protestantism but now shapes western secular modes of thinking. For the religiously 
observant subject, then, icons, interpreted broadly, can have an affective power that 
means their denigration causes real harm (Mahmood 842-50). Roger Ballard has also 
explored the significance of physical and cultural symbols to the construction of a group 
identity for Sikhs. He cites the adoption of the name Singh by Sikh men and the name 
Kaur by Sikh women, alongside the sporting of beards and turbans by men, as examples 
of the means by which Sikhs construct and underline a collective identity, one that is 
visibly distinct from majoritarian Britain (Ballard 88). This is important as a way of 
signalling one’s adherence to a particular religion which necessitates a subordination of 
individual autonomy to a shared set of prescriptions and therefore to a group identity.  
Perhaps even more significantly, this distinguishability functions as a means of 
asserting a beleaguered subjectivity, one that has been marginalised and denigrated 
both in the context of hierarchies of class, race and religion in contemporary Britain and 
also more broadly, across Sikh history, given their minority status in every nation they 
inhabit. The solidarity that comes from belonging to a group or community is essential 
to such an assertion. Tariq Modood writes, “The non-white groups that are the focus of 
multiculturalism have a visibility and are subject to forms of exclusion that continue to 
sustain group identity” (106). In other words, it is the experience of exclusion or 
oppression that contributes to the forging of a group identity. Therefore, to cite Modood 
again, “a denigration of a group identity, or its distortion, or its denial, the pretence … 
that a group does not exist, the withholding of recognition or misrecognition is a form of 
oppression” (52).11 Modood highlights the conspicuousness of non-white groups. As 
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well as racial visibility, it is visible cultural difference which has been the subject of 
controversy over the last few decades. This visibility marks a refusal to assimilate into 
majoritarian British culture and a collectivism that disturbs liberal secular 
commentators, and breaches the liberal private–public division. The dichotomy of 
private individual faith (deemed legitimate) and the external symbols that make visible 
that faith (deemed shallow or feigned, but also, paradoxically, threatening) has been 
prominent in contemporary discourses about Islam in particular (for example, in 
discussions of “veiling”), as a means of differentiating “good Muslim” from “bad Muslim” 
(Mamdani). However, such binary thinking has also emerged in discussions of Sikhs. It 
is evident, for example, in debates around whether British Sikh men should be 
exempted from wearing motorcycle helmets because of their turbans which culminated 
in legislation protecting their rights in 1976; in disputes about Sikh boys wearing the 
turban to school in Britain, especially surrounding the landmark case Mandla v. Dowell-
Lee  in 1982–83;  (Parekh 243-44); and, more recently, in the case of Welsh schoolgirl 
Sarika Watkins-Singh’s 2007-08 battle to wear the kara to school (Gillan). Inevitably, 
attempts to make these symbols of difference invisible, as well as racist denigration of 
or attacks on them, only work to increase their affective power and significance for 
adherents of the faith. The objection to the use of symbols in Behzti must be read in this 
material context, as well as in the religious context Mahmood illuminates.  
Returning to the play’s treatment of the symbolic, it is significant that when 
Balbir attacks Sandhu with the kirpan in defence of Min (Bhatti, Behzti 133, 138), it 
becomes a tool of resistance against patriarchal abuse within the community rather 
than a means of defending the Sikh faith from oppression. The Ardas prayer is 
reconfigured in a similar way: while in Sikhism it is associated, historically, with a 
defence of the faith from attacks from outside the religion, in the play it accompanies 
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the atrocities committed within the religious community, or by its members.12 In the 
first instance, it forms a symbol around which Sikhs cohere in opposition to external 
attacks, while in the second instance it emphasises a cleaving of the community, 
dissension within it, or even collapse of it, whose primary cause is patriarchal abuse. 
The prayer silences the screams of Min as she is raped. Afterwards, Min struggles to 
articulate her rape – “I don’t quite know how to speak this…”, she says – and she is 
subsequently silenced, quite literally, by Teetee’s chuni, or headscarf, which is tied 
around her mouth as Teetee and Polly beat her (Bhatti, Behzti 116-18). The play’s 
commitment to highlighting and critiquing devastating patriarchal violence in a British 
Sikh community is commendable. Yet, especially given their affective power, the use of 
key Sikh symbols as a means of doing so points to the implicit presence in Behzti of a 
troubling dichotomy constructed between gender equality and minority religious 
culture. It is not insignificant, moreover, that the play’s two most likeable characters, 
Elvis and Min, both transgress gender norms. The former is feminised when he dons a 
headscarf as well as through his role as Balbir’s carer and his dancing and singing, while 
the latter is masculinised throughout the play. In particular, Min’s transgressive 
gendered identity and the privatisation of her faith make her compatible with a secular 
liberalism that recuperates some brown minority subjects in order to safely expel 
others as illegitimate, as Puar, among others, has shown. Min’s subversion of gender 
norms is juxtaposed with the patriarchal values and homophobia of the Sikh 
gurdwara/community which implicitly led to her father’s depression and suicide. For if 
Min can be read as the transgressive but domesticated religious minority subject, 
compatible with liberalism, then the community leader Sandhu embodies the “sexually 
pathological and deviant” minority subject that must be expelled—his turban, 
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repeatedly highlighted in the play, signifying hypermasculinity and homophobia but 
also, paradoxically, a perverse homosexuality (Puar xxiv).13  
Indeed, it is against a backdrop of the recuperation of Min as acceptable, and the 
important critique of patriarchy as well as oppressive norms of gender and sexuality, 
that the play’s problematic culturalism is screened. That Min’s non-Sikh liberator is not 
white but black, moreover, works to deflect or conceal an implicit “gender 
exceptionalism” (Puar 5), the idea that white British culture is singularly superior when 
it comes to gender equality. This “gender exceptionalism” or “missionary discourse” 
(Puar 5) can also be traced in some criticism of the protests against the play. Several 
commentators emphasised the fact that the protestors were predominantly older men 
who would inevitably be provoked by a play that highlights patriarchal abuse against 
women in their community (Swain; Hundal; Singh; Ray 94-95; Sharma). While this 
insight is certainly legitimate in itself, it becomes troubling when it works to silence the 
protestors altogether or dismiss their voices as illegitimate. As Mondal points out, to 
dismiss protest as illegitimate on the grounds that it is not representative of a 
community (for example, when it is articulated predominantly by older men) is 
effectively to dismiss all protest, given the diversity of most communities (19). When 
the protest is articulated predominantly by older men, moreover, this dismissal smacks 
of ageism. The failure to listen to the protestors’ voices echoes the play’s failure to take 
seriously the deep significance of Sikh symbols for the faithful. Behzti’s reductive use of 
such symbols to critique the community’s patriarchal practices constructs gender and 
sexuality rights as antithetical to those of a communal religiosity, obstructing the path 





Min’s gagging by Polly and Teetee is echoed by other incidents of silencing in the 
play. Teetee herself recalls her own gagging in the gurdwara as she was raped by 
Sandhu in her youth, and in the opening scene of the play Min gags her mother with 
sticky tape when she can no longer tolerate her verbal abuse (Bhatti, Behzti 125, 40). 
This theme of limiting speech, or limited speech, intersects with that of intercultural 
relations. Min, after her rape, redraws the boundaries which had been broken down 
slowly between her and Elvis by saying: “You have no right to address me. You’re not 
even anything to do with me … you’re prancing round, in this religious area, saying 
things. Things that don’t concern me” (112). Notably, this redrawing of boundaries, 
configured as a breakdown in communication, or silencing (“You have no right to 
address me”), is located within and attributed to the community (to Sandhu’s abuse of 
Min, which means she retreats from Elvis). Behzti, then, seems to polarise the 
community as inward-looking and censoring against a liberation from the community 
which implicitly enables intercultural communication.  
The trope of patriarchal gagging, or silencing, of women within Behzti is 
explicitly echoed in Bhatti’s subsequent play Behud (or “Beyond Belief”), a response to 
the controversy surrounding Behzti, which centres on a playwright struggling to be 
heard and features a gagged woman on its front cover (Bhatti Behud). Of course, it is 
also apparently echoed beyond the stage in the form of the protests which sought to 
silence the playwright. Here, as in the play, silence is imposed from within the 
community – by the predominantly male British Sikh protestors, on the female British 
Sikh playwright. Hytner, along with the majority of the arts establishment, declared “the 
demands of faith communities that we should be silenced” to be non-negotiable (43). 
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Listening to the voice of a playwright who seeks to expose the silencing of women’s 
voices in her community is crucial. Yet, the subordination of the British Sikh voice of 
dissent by the arts establishment – their failure to listen to the Sikh protestors, both 
preceding the opening of the play and in the extensive media coverage following the 
protests – is also a form of silencing that must be considered alongside and in tension 
with the silencing of Bhatti. 
Freshwater, in her astute chapter on Behzti, asserts: 
The Birmingham Rep ... made a serious effort to solicit feedback before the play 
opened, and to address the concerns raised: meetings were arranged with the 
city’s inter-faith council and representatives from the community; members of 
the council were allowed to attend a dress rehearsal; and notes were included in 
the programme which described Sikhism in positive terms. (148) 
Further, in an interview Freshwater conducted, director Janet Steel claims that she did 
take into account Sikh sensitivities in her direction of the play, diverging from Bhatti’s 
script in order to avoid unnecessary provocation. Certainly, these are important 
gestures on the part of the theatre. That said, Freshwater underlines Steel’s own 
emphasis on the fact that these divergences were not a “result of the interventions of 
the Sikh community’s representatives” (151). The implication here is that to permit 
members of the Sikh community to negotiate changes to the play would have been 
unconscionable. Indeed, as Grillo points out, during the dialogue between the theatre 
officials and the Sikh community representatives, while the latter thought they were 
engaged in “negotiations”, the former viewed their exchange as a “consultation”. The 
difference here is between a two-way, dialogic process, where both parties play an 
active and equal role, on the one hand, and a hierarchised situation where one party 
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(the theatre) retains a position of power, granting the other party speech but only 
within prescribed parameters, on the other. Grillo argues that in Behzti “there was room 
for manoeuvre: Sikh representatives were prepared to accept much of the play’s 
content, provided that changes were made to the setting and use of symbols, and this is 
where dialogue was possible” (“Licence to Offend?” 22). Yet, the theatre could not, or 
would not, take seriously the protestors’ perspective, underpinned by their religiosity.  
Drawing on Iris Marion Young’s use of Jean-François Lyotard’s notion of the 
differend in her study of democratic communication, we might suggest that the 
“‘regulation’ of the conflict” between the two parties was conducted on the terms and 
“in the idiom” of the theatre, which could not articulate the wrong felt by the Sikh 
community members (37). In other words, the Sikh offence could not be translated into 
the secular liberal terms of the theatre, and so it was diminished in its significance while 
not entirely dismissed. A genuine dialogue could have been facilitated only by a 
recognition of the coexistence of different and sometimes irreducible ways of thinking, 
and of the legitimacy of religious injury (no less than racial injury).14 If, as Mondal 
argues, speech is a social, communicative act, and literature is transactional – reliant on, 
and operating through, a transactional relationship between reader (or viewer) and 
writer – then one purpose of free speech and creative freedom must surely be to 
enhance communication between different peoples in a multicultural, multireligious 
society. This is a purpose that theatre, with its affective power, is particularly well 
equipped to fulfil (Mondal 9, 60, 77). In the long run, the functional authoritarianism of 
the British arts establishment, predicated on and screened behind a secular liberal 
understanding of free speech and freedom more broadly that underpins the play itself, 
helped to shut down dialogue and debate. To grant a legitimate voice to a 
disempowered minority group is also, sometimes, to grant a legitimate voice to religious 
22 
 
offence. As such, the need is for a form of secularism that listens to religiosity rather 
than silencing it or putting it in its place, as well as an understanding of the unequal 
relationship between protestors and arts establishment, gurdwara and theatre, 
community and context.  
In the play, Sandhu’s sycophancy and pandering to the white majority is ironised 
(Bhatti, Behzti 129-31), yet there are no Sikh voices of oppositionality or resistance 
against the community’s marginalisation in Britain. Beyond the stage, however, and 
outside the theatre walls, a challenge to what was perceived to be an offensive 
representation of their religious culture did make itself heard. The insularity or 
circularity of the Sikh community in the play was disturbed or broken when the play 
entered the public domain (see Ahmed ch. 4). While there is of course no excuse for the 
violence of some of the offended, the articulation of their offence through protest must 
be understood as a result of the marginalisation or muting of their voices during 
discussion.15 Further, the fact that their speech finally took the form of protest, which 
involved placards and slogans – forms of speech that are often subordinated and 
delegitimised in public discourse and debate – does not mean that we should not listen 
to it or take it seriously, because speech, in the forms it can take as well as in its volume, 
is shaped by social, cultural and economic capital. Young, in her discussion of inclusive 
communication as a criterion of democracy, makes this important point, underlining the 
correlation between dispassionate forms of speech, which are taken more seriously, and 
privilege (63). She writes:  
Demonstration and protest, the use of emotionally charged language and 
symbols, publicly ridiculing or mocking exclusive or dismissive behaviour of 
others, are sometimes appropriate and effective ways of getting attention for 
issues of legitimate public concern, but which would otherwise not be likely to 
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get a hearing, either because they threaten powerful interests or because they 
particularly concern a marginalized or minority group. (67) 
Young’s reference to symbols here is notable, again underlining the significance 
symbols can assume for minority groups, especially the religiously observant.  
Since Young was writing and since the controversy surrounding Behzti took 
place, social media, in its various and expanding forms, has opened up new avenues of 
communication for disadvantaged minority groups, arguably democratising debate and 
even, albeit marginally, diminishing the gap between establishment and dissenting 
voices by giving the latter access to written forms of protest. Further, it is significant 
and heartening to note that the decision by PEN to award their Freedom of Expression 
Courage prize to Charlie Hebdo in 2015, in the wake of the controversy, provoked 
objections by six high-profile writers (including Peter Carey and Michael Ondaatje) 
because of the magazine’s offensive depictions of Muslims as well as “the 
disenfranchised generally”, suggesting the emergence of a more nuanced approach to 
such issues among literary and cultural gatekeepers (Flood and Yuhas). In his reading of 
the Behzti controversy, Grillo, too, notes the restraint exercised by British newspapers 
in the wake of the Danish cartoons controversy. In contrast to their French and other 
European counterparts, they made the decision to refrain from publishing the cartoons 
on the grounds that freedom of speech did not equate to a licence to offend (Grillo, 
“Artistic” 122-23).  
Yet, notwithstanding some evidence of more nuance and understanding in recent 
approaches to literary controversies involving religious offence, a liberal secularist 
blindness to the context-bound nature of religious sensitivities and the racial and 
religious coding of the “freedom of speech” principle continues to prevail (S. Malik, 
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“Limits”). In his 2012 memoir Joseph Anton, Salman Rushdie, with reference to the 
furore over his 1988 novel, asks “Who shall have control over the story?” For him, this 
was the question at the heart of the Satanic Verses controversy, and for him, the answer 
is “Everyone and anyone has, or should have that power” (Rushdie 360). Here (and 
elsewhere) Rushdie is engaged in a staunch defence of his right to tell his story, against 
censuring and censorious protestors – yet the qualifying words “should have” in his 
response to his own question suggest a fleeting recognition of the inequality of access to 
speech or story-telling. Read against the grain, these words point to the lack of control 
of beleaguered minority religious communities, such as the working-class British 
Muslims who protested against Rushdie’s novel, or the British Sikh protestors against 
Behzti, over their story and the manner in which their story is told. A recognition of the 
unequal access to storytelling or speech, and an expansion of the parameters of 
legitimate speech to encompass religiosity and religious offence, are crucial to attaining 
a multiculturalism of reciprocity and respect in Britain today.  
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1 In 2010, there was an unpublicised reading of the play at the Soho Theatre but this was only 
advertised to the audience of Behud, Bhatti’s subsequent play. 
2 For a contextualisation of the Behzti affair in these legislative debates and manoeuvres, see 
Grillo, “Artistic licence” 117-119. 
3 For a helpful overview of literary controversies involving minority religious offence since the 
Rushdie affair, see Mondal 21; Grillo, “Artistic Licence” 108. For a helpful overview of cases of 
censorship in the performing arts, including that of Behzti, as well as an analysis of the multiple 
and shifting meanings and uses of the term “censorship”, see Reinelt. 
4 For the significance of the turban in particular to Sikhs, see Puar 196. It is worth noting here 
that unlike Muslim women, Sikh women are generally less visible than Sikh men (as it is less 
usual for women to opt to wear the turban, which is the most visible marker of the religion). 
5 Here, my approach echoes my readings of controversies in Ahmed ch. 2 and 4).  
6 For an illumination of the unintelligibility for secular liberals of religious injury caused by 
insult to material objects and “icons”, see Mahmood, especially 842-50.  
7 *** 
8 For a similarly negative representation of the gurdwara as of limited hospitality, see Sahota.  
9 See my reading of Brick Lane in which the community is similarly cut off from its context 
(Ahmed ch. 4). 
10 Saba Mahmood and Peter G. Danchin, among others, have written on the untenability of the 
binary of the secular and the religious, which are, as they demonstrate, intertwined in different 
ways in different national contexts (see Mahmood and Danchin).  
11 Here Modood cites Charles Taylor.  
12 See, for example, www.discoversikhism.com/sikhism/sikh_ardas.html.  





14 See Mahmood 852-53, 860. For the irreducibility of secular, “rational” modes of thought and 
those underpinned by the sacred, or supernatural, and the importance of maintaining that 
irreducibility, see also Chakrabarty 97-113.  
15 The protests did attract some members of extremist groups whose politics or actions are 
clearly not legitimate (Grillo, “Licence to offend?” 12). 
